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Õª  Òª£ºThis paper analyzes the effect of firm risk on the implementation of executive stock options. A sample of 50 Chinese listed companies’ Executive Stock Options (ESOs) is priced by the ESO pricing method under FASB 123, which is based on the Stochastic Volatility model. It is found that firm risk significantly affects the total grant value of ESOs. Firms with higher risk and better growth opportunities are likely to have a higher ESO proportion in the executive incentives plans. The effects of executive shareholding proportion, leverage ratio, and market value on ESOs are also examined.