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We investigate the effectiveness of two bundled payment schemes that reimburse healthcare service providers for inpatient costs, namely Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) and Diagnosis-Intervention Packet (DIP), within the context of a healthcare regulator operating under budget constraints. While the DRG scheme entails a predetermined payment amount based on projections, the DIP scheme determines the payment amount ex-post based on actual hospitalization records. To analyze these dynamics, we construct a three-stage game-theoretical model incorporating an unobservable M/M/1 queueing system to capture the interactions among the healthcare regulator, hospital service providers, and (in)patients. We find that service providers are more profitable under DIP than DRG, and their service cost reduction decision is closely tied to service capacity expansion decision. Indeed, increased capacity attracts more patients to join the system, amplifying the benefits of lower marginal service costs. However, no single scheme consistently outperforms the other, considering the average cost. We identify circumstances favoring the adoption of DRG or DIP in the regulator¡¯s decision-making process.

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