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High electronic repair costs are often driven by manufacturers¡¯ use of integrated designs that bundle components, limiting repairability and encouraging replacement. In response, Right-to-Repair (RTR) regulations have emerged globally, aiming to reduce repair costs, enhance consumer rights, and promote sustainability by mandating access to repair parts and information. We develop a game-theoretic model to examine how RTR affects manufacturers¡¯ product design and pricing strategies, as well as its broader economic and environmental outcomes. We find that without RTR, modular design is optimal only when component costs are low and failure probabilities are either low or high. When costs are high, modular design is more profitable. However, under RTR, modular design becomes strictly optimal across all conditions due to its repair efficiency and the regulatory price commitment effect.
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