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Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China¡¯s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Importantly, the rating-interest relation goes back to normal after the stimulus programme ends, suggesting that any deviation is temporary. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.

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